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Unfortunately, as we all know, the philosophy of science is a very difficult subject of byzantine
complexity and unplumbed depth. (Ziman, 1994, p. 27)

In a recent article in this journal, Brian Alters (1997) argued that, given the many ways in which
the nature of science (NOS) is described and poor student responses to NOS instruments such as
Nature of Scientific Knowledge Scale (NSKS), Nature of Science Scale (NOSS), Test on
Understanding Science (TOUS), and others, it is time for science educators to reconsider the
standard lists of tenets for the NOS. Alters suggested that philosophers of science are authorities
on the NOS and that consequently, it would be wise to investigate their views of current NOS
tenets. To that end, he conducted a survey of members of the Philosophy of Science Association,
and, via various statistical techniques, made claims about the nature and extent of variation
among philosophers of science regarding basic beliefs about the NOS.

!

As three philosophers of science, we laud Alters’ attempt to understand philosophers of science’
view on the NOS. We believe, however, that his techniques for investigating this question are
inappropriate and that consequently, several of his conclusions are unwarranted. In this
comment, we will substantiate these criticisms. In addition, we will address some of the
important questions that motivate Alters’ research and attempt to unravel the “byzantine
complexity” of philosophical views about the NOS. We begin with our concerns regarding
Alters’ research. We then provide a taxonomy of philosophic issues; and finally, we suggest some
roles for philosophy of science in science teaching and the education of science teachers.

!
!

Concerns with Alters’ Research

!

!

Essentialism and Family Resemblance

The concept of the NOS seems to presuppose: (a) that there is a nature of science to be
discovered and taught to students; (b) that a list of tenets can describe the nature of science; and
(c) that for a discipline to count as a science, each of the tenets must be true of that discipline. In
philosophical parlance, this is an essentialist view of science, for there is believed to be one
essence of nature or set of criteria that describes all and only the activities and inquiries that
count as science. Most philosophers of science and science educators who have considered this
question have concluded that this essentialist view cannot be maintained. Instead, they treat
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“science” as what Ludwig Wittgenstein called a family resemblance concept. “Science” is not a
sharply circumscribed concept, but denotes rather a series of paradigmatic examples and—
importantly—a rider such as “and other closely similar activities.” Any science uses methods and
has values belonging to this series. However, no science need exhibit all of them.

!

Pedagogically, essentialism about the NOS may be appropriate. That is, a de cision that must be
made based on the developmental level of the students in question. Nonetheless, the
presupposition is problematic as it appears in Alters’ study, for it leads to many philosophic
controversies. For the purposes of our discussion, we will continue to use the standard science
education label of “the nature of science,” recognizing that it stands for a cluster of values,
methods, and activities. On this basis, we will now proceed to our assessment of Alters’ study.

!

Contrary to Alters, we think that the lists of tenets he cites show important areas of consensus
among science educators. We will first consider four areas of consensus among science educators
and then specify two areas of dissensus that are related closely to debates in philosophy of
science. Our generalizations below refer to writings on the NOS by Kimball (1967) and also
those cited by Alters: Giddings, Lederman, Cleminson, and Ryan and Aikenhead. Our intention
is not to provide an exhaustive reading of the actual views on the NOS held by the authors Alters
cites. We simply wish to show that many of the tenet lists Alters uses overlap considerably in
content.

!
!

Areas of Consensus about the NOS

The Main Purpose of Science Is to Acquire Knowledge of the Physical World. Kimball’s (1967)
first tenet is: “The fundamental driving force in science is curiosity concerning the physical
universe. It has no connection with outcomes, applications, or uses aside from the generation of
new knowledge” (p. 111). Many adopt this tenet, and Alters chose part of it to be the first survey
question.

!

There Is an Underlying Order in the World Which Science Seeks to Describe in a Maximally
Simple and Comprehensive Manner. This belief encompasses several popular tenets: first, that
the world is orderly; and second, that science seeks to construct theories which describe this
order. Other tenets stress that theories should be comprehensive and use mathematical tools for
precision and simplicity.

!

Science is Dynamic, Changing, and Tentative. Science educators appear also to agree that
science does not consist in a static collection of facts. Indeed, it is an ongoing process,
sometimes punctuated by striking changes in beliefs and methods. As a result, we cannot take
current scientific knowledge to be complete and final.

!

There Is No One, Single Scientific Method. The view that there is no one scientific method
appears to be widely held and is consistent with the nonessentialist view of science described
above. The view is expressed in the following tenet offered by Kimball (1967): “There is no one
!2

‘scientific method’ as often described in school science textbooks. . . .” (p. 111). Kimball and
others rejected an overly simplified hypothetico-deductive method that is frequently given as the
only example of scientific methodology in the initial chapters of textbooks and assumed in some
science education research (e.g., Lawson, 1993; Lawson et al., 1993).

!

Areas of Dissensus about the NOS

!

The Generation of Scientific Knowledge Depends on Theoretical Commitments and Social and
Historical Factors. Few deny that theoretical commitments and social and historical factors play
some roles in science. However, there is considerable disagreement about their nature and
strength. Beginning with the issue of theoretical commitments, we find representative remarks by
Cleminson: “observation alone cannot give rise to scientific knowledge in a simple inductivist
manner” (cited in Alters, 1997, p. 41); and “We view the world through theoretical lenses built
up from prior knowledge.” These beliefs are closely associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn,
who argued that it is impossible to make a firm distinction between observational and theoretical
languages in the way that some logical positivists had hoped (Maxwell, 1962; Kuhn, 1970;
Feyerabend, 1993). On the views of Cleminson and Ryan and Aikenhead, standards for the
acceptance of scientific beliefs are also strongly subject to social and historical influence. In two
tenets, Cleminson relatedly emphasized that science is “a personal and immensely human
activity” that is subject to human stubbornness: “Abandoning cherished knowledge that has been
falsified usually occurs with reluctance” (cited in Alters, 1997, p. 41).

!

In contrast, Kimball’s (1967) tenets do not acknowledge the influence of theoretical
commitments. In Kimball, and also in Giddings (cited in Alters, 1997, p. 40), we find the claim
that “Science has a unique attribute of openness, both openness of mind, allowing for willingness
to change opinion in the face of evidence, and openness of the realm of investigation, unlimited
by such factors as religion, politics, or geography” (Kimball, 1967, pp. 111–112).

!
!

The Truth of Scientific Theories Is Determined by Features of the World Which Exist
Independently of the Scientist. This area of dissensus concerns criteria for determining the truth
or falsity of scientific theories and claims. Gidding’s claim that “There exists an objective,
external world, independent of the existence of an observer” is a version of the ontological
theory philosophers call realism (cited in Alters, 1997, p. 40). For realists, whether a theory or
hypothesis is true is ultimately a matter of the way the world really is. Nature is the tribunal of
scientific truth, not scientists. On the other hand, there are several tenets which, although
somewhat ambiguous, suggest contrary views. Cleminson claimed that “Scientists study a world
of which they are a part, not a world from which they are apart” (cited in Alters, 1997, p. 41).
This tenet may mean that nature is partly or wholly determined by the cognitive, theoretical, or
social characteristics of scientists. A second tenet, offered by Ryan and Aikenhead, is more
clearly antirealist: “Consensus among self-appointed experts is the basis of scientific knowledge”
(cited in Alters, 1997, p. 41). This statement, representative of the movement in science studies
known as social constructionism, replaces nature as an arbiter of scientific beliefs with scientists.
!3
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Although our discussion of some of the central NOS tenets is rough and incomplete, it shows
broad patterns of agreement and disagreement among science educators. Of those four areas
about which there is agreement, we believe that nearly all philosophers of science (and also
scientists themselves) would express agreement with science educators. On the other hand, the
areas in which science educators disagree also represent areas of controversy among
philosophers of science.

!

Testing Philosophers of Science on Their NOS Beliefs

!

Alters’ goal in conducting his survey was to seek assistance in resolving inconsistencies between
the “myriad tenets in circulation” in the science education literature. As he put it, “we must call
to authority, to those who study purported tenets of the natural sciences—philosophers of science
—not only to examine the various basic tenets of the NOS held by science education
organizations and researchers, but to provide some insight into establishing more accurate
criteria for the NOS” (1997, p. 42). The results of Alters’ survey have been criticized by Smith et
al. (1997), who showed that Alters overstated the level of disagreement among philosophers and
their disagreement with the NOS tenets. We concur with Smith et al. The survey responses do not
disambiguate those aspects of a tenet with which different philosophers agree or disagree. We do,
however, have several additional concerns not considered by Smith et al.

!

First, some of the tenets appear to address several different philosophical issues or debates. It is
likely, therefore, that important philosophical differences of belief are obscured by different
philosophers’ interpretations of the tenets. For example, consider Survey Question 11:
“Consensus among self-appointed experts is the basis of scientific knowledge” (Alters, p. 49). In
the contemporary landscape of philosophy of science, this tenet really involves several
controversial questions about which philosophers disagree: Social constructionists may agree
that experts are the tribunal of scientific truth, but they may disagree about whether they are
really self-appointed. Others may agree that social consensus is important in science, yet deny
that consensus is rightly called a basis or deny that there is just one basis undergirding science.

!

Second, serious difficulties attend Alters’ “discovery” of 11 philosophical positions about space
and time in particular and philosophy of science in general. Alters identified these 11 underlying
philosophies using Survey Questions 17 and 18. He asked philosophers to “indicate [their]
strength of belief in each of . . . four basic philosophies” as they relate, first, to “the epistemology
of theories of the structure of space” and, second, “to the epistemology of scientific theories in
general” (Alters, p. 50). The four basic philosophies are apriorism, conventionalism, positivism,
and realism. Alters then defined his 11 basic philosophies by identifying clusters of philosophers
whose responses to these two questions occupied certain subspaces within the four- dimensional
space of possible “strength of belief” assignments. For instance, Position 3 included all
philosophers who indicated a strength of belief of 5–23% in conventionalism, 50–100% in
realism, and 0% in apriorism and positivism.

!
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There are difficulties with Alters’ procedure. First, Alters correctly noted that different
philosophers use these terms in different ways, so he offered “clarificatory” definitions of these
terms. Still, the resulting definitions are mistaken or confusing. We have room only to assert that
these definitions are idiosyncratic and frequently ambiguous. We suspect that this circumstance
obscured the responses of individual philosophers to Questions 17 and 18.

!

Third, the instructions for Questions 17 and 18 present these four philosophies (in some sense) as
alternatives to each other. Yet, on our understanding of positivism, a priorism, conventionalism,
and realism, these views are not clearly alternatives. The first two are general theories of the
sources of knowledge (belonging to epistemology). Conventionalism, however, is a theory of
meaning (semantics) and realism is a theory about what really exists in the world (metaphysics).
Although positivism and apriorism are often regarded as opposing, alternative epistemological
theories, it is not clear how these are individually to be understood as alternatives to both
conventionalism and to realism. From our point of view, the questions confuse us in much the
same way as one would be confused by instructions to rank (in order of preference) cheesecake,
apple pie, mathematics, and tennis. We do not claim that semantics and metaphysics are
irrelevant to epistemology, only that philosophers with similar views about semantics or
metaphysics may diverge sharply on epistemology.

!

A fourth difficulty involves Alters’ use of the term “strength of belief” in his instructions for
Questions 17 and 18. The term “strength of belief” alone suggests that what is intended is what
philosophers call subjective (or personal) probability (i.e., a person’s estimate of the probability
that a given statement is true). However, if philosophers were to interpret the question in this
way, most would have believed it necessary to assign 0% to each philosophy, because most
would not think that any of the positions expressed were completely true. The fact that Alters
instructed that respondents’ percentages sum to unity, however, suggests that the probabilities
must be interpreted in a different way: namely, as the degree to which philosophers thought each
of the positions was correct. Although it is true that philosophers might think that each of these
positions is correct to a certain degree, it is hard to see how to assign percentages in this way.
One could never, for example, assign a percentage to conventionalism (or any of the other
philosophies) by estimating the percentage of the (infinite) class of propositions in the physical
sciences involving conventional definitions.

!

The final set of difficulties that we address involves Alters’ use of analysis of variance to infer
the significance of the 11 philosophies for respondents’ views about NOS tenets. He attributed
statistical variance on responses to differing answers on Questions 17 and 18 of his survey.
However, statistically significant results would have been obtained from many other partitions of
this data set, as well. Alters seemed to be offering a causal explanation of why philosophers
answered the survey questions as they did. As has clearly been shown by Lewontin (1974),
however, the existence of statistically significant differences revealed by analysis of variance is
consistent with a wide variety of different causal structures. Lewontin’s criticisms apply even if
differences in means are attributable to real differences in individuals in the population, but our
discussion shows that the situation is even worse, since the 11 philosophical positions used in
!5

Alters’ analysis of variance and multivariate analysis of variance calculations are artifacts of
experimental design.

!
!
!

A Taxonomy of Philosophic Issues

Our general conclusion is that Alters’ study obscures the substantial areas of consensus among
both science educators and philosophers of science and fails to reveal what the contentious
philosophic issues are. Our analysis leads us to assert, more broadly, that attempts to chart the
philosophical landscape by means of quantitative methods will fail. The philosophical questions
involved in the NOS are simply too intricate and interrelated to be reliably encoded by surveys or
other quantitative studies.

!

How, then, can science educators take advantage of philosophy of science to help resolve
pressing issues about teaching the nature of science? We suggest that, rather than appealing to
philosophers as authorities, science educators become acquainted with philosophical debates
about science, and with the arguments and kinds of evidence adduced in favor of different
positions. Just as science educators stress that science is more than a collection of facts, we
emphasize that a philosophical position about the nature of science is more than a list of tenets.
Some science educators have engaged philosophical literature on the NOS. While the efforts of
some have paid off well (e.g., Matthews, 1997, 1994), others have had less success, as our
epigraph suggests.

!

Philosophers of science should do their part by helping to make explicit the connections between
philosophical literature and the educators’ NOS debate. Although it is beyond the scope of this
article to provide a full analysis of these connections, we offer the following brief taxonomy of
the main issues in philosophy of science today to help focus interdisciplinary discussion about
the NOS. Before we begin, however, we emphasize that philosophy of science is a dynamic,
changing field, and also that philosophy of science is increasingly specialized. Philosophers of
quantum mechanics, for example, may have concerns that overlap little with philosophers of
biology, chemistry, or social science. None of the lively debates endemic to particular
philosophies of science are presented here. To the extent that philosophy of science remains a
unified field of study, however, the following issues are both important and relevant for
understanding the NOS. We present them in no particular order.

!

Unity of Science versus Disunity of Science. This debate bears directly on the NOS tenets
because some philosophers of science believe that different sciences have very little in common.
Some advocates of the disunity of science believe that there simply is no “nature” of science;
some believe that there is nonetheless a family resemblance. There are a variety of reasons
available (metaphysical, epistemological, and scientific) for holding these views which we have
not discussed, most of which bear on the NOS issues (e.g., Nagel, 1961; Hacking, 1996; Dupré,
1993; Rosenberg, 1994).

!
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Demarcation. The task of demarcating science from other forms of inquiry was an important
component of philosophy of science of the 1930s and 1940s (that is, of logical positivism or
logical empiricism). In the wake of its decline, most philosophers believe that it is impossible to
formulate criteria that demarcate science and nonscience. This question is closely related to that
of the unity and disunity of science. Some believe that theories and practices can be identified as
more or less scientific, while a few—particularly those inspired by developments in literary
theory (and all things French)—would maintain that there is no distinction at all between science
and nonscience. The view that there is no genuine distinction tends also to be championed by
some sociologists of science, particularly social constructionists. On the other hand, philosophers
active in debates about creationism and a constitutional (as opposed to philosophical) separation
of science and religion argue that some ways to demarcate science from nonscience, such as
Popperian demarcation, remain workable and important (e.g., Ruse, 1996; Holton, 1993).

!

Realism versus Instrumentalism. Debate about realism was mentioned above and takes different
forms in different branches of philosophy of science. Usually, it concerns the metaphysical
question of whether theoretically posited entities (such as quarks in physics, or economies in
social science, or species in biology) actually exist objectively and behave according to the
theories or laws that describe them. A realist in one of these domains believes such entities do
exist, often on the grounds that theories about them would otherwise not be successful.
Instrumentalists, or antirealists, believe instead either that such entities do not exist or that the
success of theories does not reliably prove that they exist. They regard theories and theoretical
entities as tools or instruments that nonetheless help us to understand and manipulate the world.
Some philosophers are realists about one scientific domain, but antirealists about others.
Furthermore, some philosophers classify themselves neither as realists or antirealists, but argue
in- stead that the realism debate is sterile, or even meaningless (see, e.g., Boyd, 1983; van
Fraassen, 1980; Fine, 1986; Pickering, 1984).

!

Rationalism versus Historicism. Largely in response to Thomas Kuhn’s influential work (1974,
1970), in which the history of science is portrayed as a sequence of sometimes mutually
contradictory paradigms or worldviews, the issue known as “theory choice” came to dominate
philosophy of science. Viewed one way, the central question is whether scientists rationally and
deliberately choose which theories they believe are best (rationalism) or whether, as Kuhn
seemed to imply, their allegiances are determined by historical and social forces manifest in their
training and in intellectual fashions (historicism). Kuhn even likened changes of scientific belief
to religious “conversion experiences” (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 151 and 204) and thereby challenged
critics to specify precisely in what scientific rationality consists. Most who took up the challenge
(Lakatos, 1978; Laudan, 1984, 1977) agreed with Kuhn that scientific change was sometimes
radical and revolutionary, but aimed to show that the process was still either rational or
progressive in certain ways. Others attempted to apply Bayes’ theorem of rational choice to
theory choice in science. This debate, however, has largely fallen from philosophical interest in
recent years. Almost all philosophers (but not all historians or sociologists) now eschew radical
historicism.

!

!7

Practice and Experiment versus Theory. This debate involves the question: Is science a body of
knowledge or is it something more inclusive, such as a way of life or a body of practical
techniques? Several philosophers and historians in the 1980s argued that to fully understand the
NOS, one must take into account the way scientists do experiments, the ways they organize and
structure their laboratories, and the ways they operate in political, economic, and cultural
networks. Most philosophers would agree that these are important for understanding science.
One important area of disagreement, however, is whether scientific knowledge is merely
contained within scientific practice or scientific culture on the one hand, or whether it is
inextricably formed and maintained by it (e.g., Galison, 1987; Pickering, 1984; Latour and
Woolgar, 1986).

!

Feminist Philosophy of Science. Historically, women have been excluded from science. How has
this shaped scientific theory or scientific practice? Feminist authors ask: Whose knowledge is
this? Whose experiences provide the evidence? Who decides what the scientific goals are?
Feminists approach the goals of science as multilayered and context dependent, frequently
claiming that there is no unconditioned subject position. Rather, knowledge results from social
interactions among members of a community and between them and the purported objects of
knowledge. Some feminists claim that male-centered science results in bias or problematic and
unquestioned presuppositions. Other questions include: Are there distinct feminist research
methods? If so, are they appropriate for the natural sciences? What would a feminist science look
like? Most feminists claim that taking these concerns into account will result in better science.
Some claim, more strongly, a different science will result (see, e.g., Harding, 1996, 1989; Keller,
1983; Keller & Longino, 1996; Lederman, 1993; Longino, 1990; Rosser, 1992).

!
!
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Recommendations for Science Education

As philosophers of science, we are not experts on science pedagogy. However, we are quite
familiar with problems that arise in teaching our students about the nature of science. Although
our judgments are based upon our experiences in teaching to undergraduates, we think they may
be relevant to teaching students at other levels. Thus, we would like to conclude with a few
remarks about which philosophical issues can be fruitfully discussed with both secondary school
students, and with their teachers in science education courses, and which are better avoided.

!

First, we suggest that educators avoid discussing the failings of logical positivism. From the
sources we have seen, it appears that the position science educators call logical positivism is a
straw man position held by at most a few philosophers, and only for a short period of time 70
years ago. Instead, educators should discuss the idea of empiricism more generally. This would
include discussion of the many and different ways that experience and the use of experiments
informs scientific beliefs, and also the important fact that scientists often argue about how to
understand and interpret the results of measurements and experiments. The history of science is a
rich source of examples and should be used for illustration.

!
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Second, we suggest that philosophical debates about realism should be avoided, and that a
naively realist view is most appropriate for science education. A naively realist view accepts the
existence of the entities scientist study and avoids nuanced and controversial philosophical
debate about realism. These debates are often Byzantine and confusing even to those of us who
work in them. Our experience is that many students on first exposure misunderstand antirealism
and instrumentalism.

!

Third, it is valuable to introduce students at an elementary level to some of the ideas developed
by Kuhn. In particular, we find that students benefit by considering the idea that different
paradigms compete with each other, and that they can easily understand some of the ways in
which theoretical commitments and social issues can influence the development of science. On
the other hand, students should be made aware that some interpretations of Kuhn’s views are
extreme and not persuasive (such as the popular claim of radical incommensurability between
paradigms). The middle of the road approach we offer here seems to be suggested by some of the
NOS tenets given in the American Association for the Advancement of Science reports.

!

Fourth, we believe that strong social constructivism should be avoided. We believe that
Matthews (1994, 1993) correctly diagnosed the problem with the constructivist position
advocated by some science educators. These educators begin with valuable psychological,
historical, and epistemological insights about the role of the mind and of society in shaping
perception and inference. However, they proceed often to infer unwarranted metaphysical views.
Some philosophers and educators may disagree with this diagnosis, but we think it indisputable
that the relations between these psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical issues are
subtle. We believe that discussion of them is likely to create more confusion than insight.

!

Finally, although we have described significant areas of philosophical disagreement about the
nature of science, we do not advocate developing multiple sets of views about the NOS as Alters
envisioned (1997, p. 42). Such an approach easily leads to an overly simplistic pluralism in
which all philosophical positions are seen as equally viable. Instead, we recommend illustrating
the rich complexity of science with its practice and its history. Such study will offer students a
better picture of the complex family resemblances between all the activities we call science.

!
!
!
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